“Can Islam & Liberalism Co-exist?” An Interview with Shadi Hamid

A worth reading interview by Isaac Chotiner that analyses many challenges facing Muslims today, and where religious and liberal leaders are falling short in understanding the problems. Both liberals and conservatives will find it fascinating. ( f. sheikh). 

Shadi Hamid, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, is the author of a new book, Islamic Exceptionalism: How the Struggle Over Islam Is Reshaping the World. The title gives some hint of his provocative analysis. As he writes, “If Islam is, in fact, distinctive in how it relates to politics, then the foundational divides that have torn the Middle East apart will persist, and for a long time to come.”

I recently spoke by phone with Hamid. During the course of our conversation, which has been edited and condensed for clarity, we discussed why liberals have trouble taking religion seriously, the future of Islamist politics in Turkey and Egypt, and what the rise of Donald Trump has meant for American Muslims.

Isaac Chotiner: What precisely do you mean by “Islamic exceptionalism”?

Shadi Hamid: I’m essentially arguing that Islam is fundamentally different from other religions in a very specific way: its relationship to law and politics and governance. I wanted to use “exceptionalism” because I felt, at least for me, that it was value-neutral: It can be either good or bad depending on the context. I also wanted to challenge the assumption—very common in the bastions of Northeastern liberal elitism—that religion playing a role in public life is always or necessarily a bad thing. That’s the idea of the title, and what that means in practice is that Islam has proven to be resistant to secularism, and I would argue will continue to be resistant to secularism and secularization really for the rest of our lives.

What do you think it is about Islam that makes it resistant to secularism in a way that, say, Christianity and Judaism are not?

I think you have to go back to the founding moment 14 centuries ago. Jesus was a dissident against a reigning state, so he was never in a position to govern. Naturally, the New Testament is not going to have much to say about public law. Prophet Muhammad wasn’t just a prophet. He was also a politician, and not just a politician, but a head of state and a state-builder. If Prophet Muhammad was in a position of holding territory and governing territory, then presumably the Quran would have to have something to say about governance. Otherwise, how would Prophet Muhammad be guided? That’s one thing intertwining the religion and politics that isn’t accidental, and was meant to be that way.

In practice, what that means is that if you’re a Muslim secular reformer today, you can make arguments for secularism. I’m not saying that’s impossible. There have been a number of fascinating, quite creative, secular-oriented thinkers in recent decades. But the problem is they have to argue against the prophetic model, so it’s unlikely that those ideas will gain mass traction in Muslim-majority countries.

The argument against that would be that religions are interpreted in different ways because of different historical circumstances, and thus the reason Islam is being interpreted in certain ways is because of the historical circumstances that Islam has found itself in.

Yeah, but I don’t think religions can be anything we want them to be. This idea that we can sort of transform ideas in our own image and in any way we want—if we could do that then what would be the point of different religions? Presumably religions are different because they’re different, and people make their choices accordingly. Every religion has its own boundaries of how far you can go. In the case of Christianity, you can’t really be theologically Christian in any meaningful sense if you think Jesus was just an ordinary dude, right? Christianity without Christ loses its meaning; you can be culturally Christian or nominally Christian, but the theological content isn’t really there. It’s the same thing with Islam, and that leads to the other factor that I talk about in the book in regards to exceptionalism: Muslims don’t just believe that the Quran is the word of God; they believe it is God’s actual speech. That might sound like a semantic difference, but I think it’s actually really important.

You yourself are Muslim correct?

Yeah, yeah, I’m Muslim.

Well, OK, but I assume you don’t believe what you just said about the Quran.

Laughs.] Here’s the thing: If something is a credal requirement and if you take that out of the religion, then you lose a lot of the foundation. Then you have to ask yourself what is actually the content or meaning of that religion. I don’t want to make an essentialist argument. I’ve been attacked quite a bit since the book came out for exceptionalism and orientalism, and God knows what else. I think what you said earlier about history mattering is really important, so I can imagine a counter-factual history: Let’s say Prophet Mohammad wasn’t able to capture whole territory. What if he lost some of those early critical battles? Then presumably Islam would be completely different today because the Quran itself would be different, because it wouldn’t have as much to say about governance if Prophet Muhammad never governed.

It just seems that lots of people define themselves as Muslim while not believing things that other Muslims consider essential to the religion. The thing you said earlier about Jesus: I’m in Berkeley right now, and I’m sure I could find some people who consider themselves Christian who believe Jesus was an ordinary guy.

Right, but then I think then we can use other terms like identity. It becomes a kind of cultural marker, but it’s not as much a theological thing if you don’t actually believe in the theology of the religion in question. If you don’t believe Jesus played an extraordinary role, then what does it really mean to be Christian theologically?

Where do you stand on the debate over whether or to what degree ISIS is “Islamic”?

Some of my Muslim friends and colleagues, and actually for that matter my parents, criticize me for how I talk about ISIS. Look, it’s not my job to make Islam look good. Sometimes people criticize me and say, “Someone might get the wrong idea from what you’re saying, or they just might misuse or abuse your argument.” Even the phrase “Islamic exceptionalism” can be used for purposes that I don’t agree with, for anti-Muslim bigotry and all of that. It’s not my job to make Islam look good; it’s my job to honestly reflect things the way that I see them. I don’t think it’s helpful to maintain this fiction that ISIS has nothing to do with religion or nothing to do with Islam. It’s so obvious to any ordinary American who’s watching TV that religion plays some role. If we’re telling them, “Hey, actually religion has nothing to do with this,” people aren’t going to take us seriously because it’s obviously not true.

It should go without saying, and I always have to offer this disclaimer, that the overwhelming majority of Muslims oppose ISIS. Polling is quite clear on this. That doesn’t mean that people in ISIS don’t believe what they’re doing is commanded by God. This idea that we’re always assuming people couldn’t possibly believe what they say they believe—I think that’s endemic in the way we talk about religion in the United States. It’s a problem that Obama has. Obama can’t take ISIS seriously. He refuses to take ISIS seriously as something beyond just a bunch of thugs and fanatics, as he said. We can’t take them seriously as an enemy if we just dismiss them as being a bunch of thugs. I’ll say, as an American Muslim: There’s no doubt it’s a perverted version of Islam. That doesn’t mean they don’t believe it.

You said that you wanted to challenge people who thought that religion’s role in public life is always bad. We’ve been talking about the ways that Islam is incompatible with democratic politics—

No, no. I’m not saying Islam is incompatible with democratic politics; I’m saying that Islam is in tension with liberalism, and this is why I think it’s important for us to distinguish between liberalism and democracy. Let’s say an Islamist party comes to power through a democratic election. Islamism is by definition illiberal, and they would promote things that are contrary to classical liberalism, in the sense of non-negotiable personal rights and freedoms, gender equality, protection of minorities.

Fareed Zakaria was the first one to really popularize the idea of illiberal democracy. I feel like the Americans I’ve talked to have struggled to really grasp the idea because we don’t really have much experience with that directly. With the rise of Trump it makes things easier because we can see quite clearly that, Hey, this is a guy who might be democratically elected but his commitment to classical liberalism is quite questionable, even antagonistic.

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The Khans give America the voice it’s been missing

COLLEGE ADMISSION’S AND VISA RED TAPE

.Shared by Ajaz.

Pakistan’s 15-year-old record-breaker struggles to find university place

2sitara_burooj_akbar_rabwah_ahmadiyya_chenabnagar_pakistani

The brightest 15-year-old in the world can’t find a place at university because she’s too young.

Sitara Brooj Akbar moved from Rabwah, Pakistan to the UAE last year after breaking international records in passing examinations.

She is the youngest pupil to reach the top level, Band 9, in the International English Language Testing System. IELTS Band 9 qualifies her as an “expert user” of English, with “full operational command of the language: appropriate, accurate and fluent with complete understanding”.

Top universities in the United States and Britain, including Harvard, Yale, Oxford and Cambridge, require an IELTS grade of only Band 7 – but Sitara is not old enough for a visa.

“The universities there cannot sponsor a student or offer them a student visa if they are under the age of 18. There is an age restriction on university students because of visa regulations,” she said.

Sitara’s exam record-breaking began at the age of 9, when she became the youngest Pakistani to pass O-level chemistry. At 10, she set a world record by passing O-level biology.

She passed O-level English, physics and mathematics at 11, becoming the youngest child in the world to pass five O levels. She then sat A levels at the age of 13.

Even more remarkably, Sitara achieved her exam success without setting foot inside a school since the third grade.

sitara_burooj_akbar_rabwah_ahmadiyya_chenabnagar_pakistani“My parents realised that I could not learn in a traditional school learning environment, so they opted for home learning,” she said.

“I have done most of my studies sitting at a shelf in the kitchen while my mother was cooking.”

Sitara, the eldest of five children from a Punjab province,moved to Sharjah with her family nine months ago in search of higher education.

But high tuition fees proved beyond her family’s means, and the visa regulations mean she cannot study abroad.

“I have applied to all the leading universities in the USA and UK but they respond with one sentence: that they are very impressed with my academic accomplishments but I am too young to get a student visa,” Sitara said.

The British Council UAE is trying to help. “Despite Sitara’s very exceptional educational track record, her young age is a barrier,” said Faraz Waqar, its head of marketing and communications.

“Undergraduate programmes in the UK and around the world currently do not accept people as young as her. We at the British Council will try our best to guide and help Sitara towards her eventual educational goal. There are no guarantees, we can only try.

“We wish her the very best for her bright future. She deserves all the support after all her efforts and struggle.”

Sitara’s ambition is to be a researcher in biochemistry. “There are many mysteries unsolved and many cures yet to be found; I want to make my contribution to humanity through science.” Her father said they moved to UAE so that Sitara could obtain the best education.

[RabwahTimes]

A SUCCINT HISTORY OF KASHMIR’S DEADLY STRIFE

Share by Nasik Elahi

SRINAGAR, India (AP) — When news spread that Indian troops had killed 22-year-old Burhan Wani, a charismatic commander of Indian-controlled Kashmir’s biggest rebel group on July 8, the public response was spontaneous and unprecedented. Tens of thousands of angry youths poured out of their homes in towns and villages across the Himalayan region, hurling rocks and bricks and clashing with Indian troops.

A curfew and a communications blackout has failed to stop the protests. The violence has left 48 civilians dead as government forces fired live ammunition and pellets to try to quell the unrest. About 2,000 civilians and 1,500 police and soldiers have been injured in the clashes.

But Kashmir’s fury at Indian rule is not new. The stunning mountain region has known little other than conflict since 1947, when British rule of the subcontinent ended with the creation of India and Pakistan.

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THE HISTORY

The Himalayan kingdom of Jammu and Kashmir was asked to become part of one of the two newly independent nations. But Maharaja Hari Singh, the unpopular Hindu ruler of the Muslim-majority region, wanted to stay independent.

A raid by tribesmen from northwestern Pakistan forced Singh to seek help from India, which offered military assistance on condition that the kingdom accede to India. The ruler accepted but insisted that Kashmir remain a largely autonomous state within the Indian union, with India managing its foreign affairs, defense, and telecommunications.

The Indian military entered the region soon after, and the tribal raid spiraled into the first of two wars between India and Pakistan over Kashmir. The war ended in 1948 with a U.N.-brokered ceasefire. Nonetheless, Kashmir became divided between the two young nations by a heavily militarized Line of Control, with the promise of U.N.-sponsored referendum in the future.

In Indian-controlled Kashmir, many saw the transition as the mere transfer of power from their Hindu king to Hindu-majority India. Kashmiri discontent against India started taking root as successive Indian governments breached the pact of Kashmir’s autonomy. Local governments were toppled one after another, and largely peaceful movements against Indian control curbed harshly.

Pakistan continued raising the Kashmir dispute in international forums, including in the U.N. India began calling the region its integral part, saying that Kashmir’s lawmakers had ratified the accession to New Delhi.

As the deadlock persisted, India and Pakistan went to war again in 1965, with little changing on the ground. Several rounds of talks followed, but the impasse continued.

In the mid-1980s, dissident political groups in Indian Kashmir united and contest elections for the state assembly. The Muslim United Front quickly emerged as a formidable force against Kashmir’s pro-India political elite. However, the front lost the 1987 election, widely believed to have been heavily rigged.

A strong public backlash followed. Some young MUF activists crossed over to Pakistan-controlled Kashmir, where the Pakistani military began arming and training Kashmiri nationalists.

By 1989, Kashmir was in the throes of a full-blown rebellion.

India poured in more troops into the already heavily militarized region. In response, thousands of Kashmiris streamed back from the Pakistani-controlled portion with guns and grenades. More than 68,000 people have been killed since then.

Though the militancy waned, popular sentiment for “azadi,” or freedom, has remained ingrained in the Kashmiri psyche. In the last decade, the region has made a transition from armed rebellion to unarmed uprisings as tens of thousands of civilians frequently take to the streets to protest Indian rule, often leading to clashes between rock-throwing residents and Indian troops. The protests are quelled by deadly force.

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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

In 2008, a government decision — later revoked — to transfer land to a Hindu shrine in Kashmir set off a summer of protests. The following year, the alleged rape and murder of two young women by government forces set off fresh violence.

In 2010, the trigger for protests was a police investigation into allegations that soldiers shot dead three civilians and then staged a fake gunbattle to make it appear the dead were militants and claim rewards for the killings.

In all three years, hundreds of thousands of young men and women took to the streets, hurling rocks and abuse at Indian forces. At least 200 people were killed and hundreds wounded as troops fired iknto the crowds, inciting further protests.

The crackdown appears to be pushing many educated young Kashmiris, who grew up politically radicalized amid decades of brutal conflict, toward armed rebel groups. Young Kashmiri boys began snatching weapons from Indian forces and training themselves deep inside Kashmir’s forests.

The number of militants has, however, remained minuscule, not crossing 200 in the last several years.

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ANTI-INDIA GROUPS

The All Parties Hurriyat Conference is a conglomerate of social, religious and political groups formed in 1993. It advocates the U.N.-sponsored right to self-determination for Kashmir or tripartite talks between India, Pakistan and Kashmiri leadership to resolve the dispute.

The Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front, or JKLF, was one of the first armed rebel groups. It favors an independent, united Kashmir. Currently led by Mohammed Yasin Malik, the group gave up armed rebellion in 1994, soon after Indian authorities released Malik from jail after four years.

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