The solution to Pakistan’s water crisis- Pakistan has oversupply of Water

Dam Equivalents: The solution to Pakistan’s water crisis

We don’t need another mega project to solve our problems. What we need is a mega-vision.

There’s a general rhetoric that, one, Pakistan is soon going to run out of water; and, two, building more dams is the ‘only solution’ to the crisis. Is this really the case?

Nature’s mechanism that brings water to Pakistan has three major components: the Indian Ocean in the south, the sun in the sky, and the high mountains—Himalayas, Karakorum and Hindukush (HKH)—in the north. When the sun shines on the ocean, it creates moist air (aka clouds) that moves north towards the land. When it strikes the mountains, it cools down and releases the moisture as rain or snow—creating glaciers, rivers and streams flowing into our landscape all the way to the Arabian Sea. This system is in place for millions of years and is not going away any time soon. For Pakistan to really run out of water, therefore, either the Indian Ocean should be dried up, the sun switched off, or the mountains flattened. As long as the sun, the ocean, and the mountains are there, Pakistan is not running out of water.

And global warming can only increase rainfall because it will provide more heat to the ocean which will result in bigger clouds – and more rains. This is evident from the data of Rawalpindi/Islamabad rainfall which has slightly increased in the past 115 years as shown in Figure 1. Global warming is not going to reduce the amount of water in our country.

Figure 1 

Now let’s see how much water we need and how much nature brings for us.

After Pakistan permitted India to divert three eastern rivers of Indus Basin away from the country, we now get an average of 145 million acre-feet (MAF) of water in our rivers each year with which we have to manage all our needs. The primary needs are food production, drinking, hygiene, sanitation, municipal, and industry.

Pakistan is now a food-surplus country and we consume 104 MAF of water annually to grow our food. However, Pakistan’s current irrigation system is one of the most wasteful systems in the world. Compared to us, Israel produces 70 per cent more, California 50 per cent more, and even Indian Punjab 30 per cent more with the same quantity of water.

If we upgrade our outdated irrigation system, we can produce surplus food with less than 50 MAF of water.

According to international standards, a community needs 35 gallons per capita per day to meet drinking, cooking, health, hygiene and municipal needs. If we want to supply this amount of water to every community in the country, all we need is 12 MAF. Catering for growing requirements of 207 million individuals, our domestic requirements can be managed well within 17 MAF.

Finally, our industrial requirements at the moment are around eight MAF. With a combination of industrial growth and efficient use of water, our future industrial requirements can be met with 10 MAF or so.

Water availability in the country versus the demand is summarised in Figure 2. This shows that we have almost twice as much water as we need.

Figure 2 

Then, why the crisis?

In the irrigation sector, which is the biggest consumer of available water, the wastage is too high both in state-managed distribution system of canals as well as on-farm practices by the farmers. The wasteful consumption has raised the demand in irrigation sector at least twice more than the need. But wastage of water aside, this is the prime reason that from neighbouring provinces to neighbouring farmers, every water user is fighting with the other over, so called, water rights and allocations. This has, therefore, compromised on the peace in the country, and thus has created a dangerous dividing line within the communities and the provinces.

The next major problem is pollution of water resources. Despite having enough water, our cities, industries and agriculture sectors, all have become engines of pollution for the natural water repositories. There is indiscriminate pollution of both the rivers and underground aquifers – leaving their waters unfit for use.

The third major problem is mismanagement and corruption within the water sector, both in the rural and urban settings. The rural sector suffers from head and tail disparities along irrigation canals where theft and manipulation of water by the powerful is common. In the urban sector, selling of public water supply through tankers is an everyday routine. Poor planning, leakage, theft, and pitiable maintenance of water supply systems in the cities deprive the citizens from getting water even when it is available.

And finally, our water managers are always lamenting that though there is enough water in the natural system, most of it is only available during the monsoons.

So, what is the way to go around these problems?

Dams don’t help

Let’s first consider dams in relation to the problems identified. Would dams fix wasteful irrigation practices? Would they control pollution? Would they help curb corrupt practices? Would they help manage excessive water supply of monsoon?

Except for the last issue, dams don’t seem to help at all. And even if the last issue is fully resolved through the construction of a large dam, the first three issues would continue to loom and our water problems would hardly improve. Moreover, dams have many downsides. Besides being exuberantly expensive, environmentally destructive and taking decades to build, they have a limited useful life before they silt up. But worst, they can act like a hammer on the dividing line between provinces on water issues and dangerously compromise peace within the country. In other words, dams do not provide a holistic solution to our major problems.

If dams cannot address wastage, pollution, mismanagement, and corruption issues, nor does their storage last long, do we have any alternatives?

The good news is, yes. Because we can think of Dam-Equivalents or DEs.

A DE comprises suites of contemporary technological, structural, and institutional interventions within a hydrologic regime, which mimic the purposes for which large dams are built, but avoid replicating their downsides.

Today’s knowledge, tools and technologies, together with a naturally-gifted hydrological regime of Pakistan, present us a grand opportunity to develop DEs in Pakistan and become the world leaders of contemporary water management.

DEs can help transform our outdated canal irrigation practices—which account for 95 per cent of all water consumption in the country—into modern systems, not only rivaling that of California’s in terms of smartness and productivity, but also raising the bar for the rest of the world in terms of sustainability, eco-friendliness, and low-carbon green-growth standards.

DEs can help us exploit the potential of Pakistan’s 3,500 kilometers of natural river network to be used as inland navigation waterways, connecting Lahore and Peshawar—and possibly Afghanistan—to the Arabian Sea, providing warm water access to the land-locked Central Asian States, thus adding billions of dollars in our economy through trades and tariffs.

DEs can help build urban water security in a way that not only every urban dweller, industry, and public utility gets enough clean water for drinking, health, hygiene, and other uses, but also provide sufficient water for horticulture that may be required for the greening and landscaping of public and private areas throughout the cityscapes.

To top it all, DEs in most cases are cheaper and faster to build as compared to building large dams, yet their functionality is way more sustainable and robust, compared to large dams – with much higher economic dividends.

Fortunately, the much-publicised water crisis in the country has nothing to do with the shortage of water. The real problem lies in obsolete infrastructure and outmoded management practices, resulting in the over-use, misuse, and pollution of our water resources.

Here’s how a DE could help

Take the example of the proposed Kalabagh Dam on the Indus River. According to Engineer Barkat Ali, a former consultant of The World Bank, the dam – at an estimated cost of $6,000 million – would provide water storage volume of 6.1 MAF (million acre-feet), bring 0.85 million acres of additional land under irrigation, and install a power generation capacity of 3,500 MW (megawatt). Annual revenue from the dam is expected to be $1,400 million from the irrigation sector and $1,500 million from power generation. However, the recent boondoggle of the Neelum-Jhelum hydropower project has cost us $5,150 million just to install 969 MW, without any storage capacity. Extrapolating from the recent facts, a project the size of Kalabagh Dam would safely be in the range of $15,000 million to $20,000 million today.

Leaving aside the politics and controversies surrounding large dam projects, let’s first consider a DE on the Indus River which may mimic the purposes of a large dam, albeit maintaining socio-economic and environmental sustainability and improved peace dividends in the region.

An opportunity for DE lies in Rohri Canal, which withdraws 8.5 MAF from Indus to irrigate 2.6 million acres. However, according to a study by the International Water Management Institute, the farmers of Rohri Canal area can only irrigate an average of 1.1 million acres in any given season (Kharif or Rabi) due to the insufficient supply of water to match the guzzling demands of the flood-irrigation methods given to the farmers.

For the suggested DE in Rohri Canal area, three interventions are proposed as illustrated in Figure 3. First, if farmers are provided with modern irrigation methods, wastage will be curtailed and water will be spared. Second, some of this spared water can be diverted to meet the chronic water supply problems of Karachi. Third, a navigation channel could be created between Kotri and the open sea, invoking the economic engine of inland navigation in the region.

Figure 3

Let’s elaborate on these interventions one by one.

A modern irrigation system for Rohri Canal command area would require the development of riverine well-fields, piped water supply systems, and all the doohickeys of modern farms like those of the Hunter Valley in Australia. The estimated cost for modernizing 2.6 million acres could range from eight to 10 billion dollars. Not only would this intervention enable farmers to cultivate the full area with just three MAF—saving 5.5 MAF—it would also increase per acre yields by at least 25 per cent, enabling farmers to earn an excess of Rs300,000 per acre annually. The overall agriculture economy of the canal command could thus reach $6,000 million a year.

This intervention alone addresses the storage and irrigation purposes of Kalabagh Dam – for the dam’s 0.85 million acres of irrigated area, the intervention brings in 1.50 million acres; and, for 6.1 MAF of storage, it provides 5.5 MAF. Interestingly though, the storage in DE is not achieved by blocking the water from reaching the downstream communities, but by releasing additional water downstream. So, while the dam would have deprived the downstream communities of water, causing conflict and discord, the DE intervention adds to peace dividends with the release of additional water for downstream users.

What about Karachi?

The second intervention suggests diverting water from the Indus River to meet the needs of Karachi – a population of 16 million or so. If we plan to supply 35 gallons per person per day of fresh water (an international standard), all we need is 1.7 MAF per year. However, to cater for storage and future needs, we can plan to divert 2.5 MAF.

Before discussing the details of transferring additional water to Karachi, a short stroll along San Antonio River in Texas could be a learning experience. San Antonio River runs through the city for 15 miles (24 Km) along which the ‘San Antonio River Walk’ has been created. Fresh flowing waters have always had an appeal for the humans. Taking advantage of the intrinsic value of its clean flowing waters, the city generates around $3,500 million worth of businesses along the River Walk. The river, however, is an illusion – a ‘tourist mirage’ as put by Robert Glennon in his account on America’s groundwater resources. It is an artificial river which receives its waters by pumping 10 million gallons per day from Edwards Aquifer to the northwest of the city.

The San Antonio River Walk model can be replicated in Karachi. As we divert 2.5 MAF to Karachi, it can be made to run through the cityscape as a carefully crafted ‘artificial river’. The river’s route could take the form of an interconnected course of lakes, streams, and ponds etc., surrounded by beautifully landscaped businesses and recreation areas. On the surface, this ‘river’ will be providing space for multi-billion dollar businesses in a beautified cityscape, but beneath its surface, this river will continuously recharge the aquifer with freshwater. Once the system is in place, it will take between two to three years to enable the city to draw water from the aquifer for day to day usage. The aquifer storage will ultimately reach its full capacity at 20 MAF or so, a staggering 10-year reserve for the city! This system will ultimately provide reliable access to clean and affordable water to every citizen of Karachi and make the city virtually drought-proof. Its cost will be more than offset by the development of water-front real estates and businesses. San Antonio River Walk earns $145 million per kilometre. If Karachi earns even half of it, the annual revenue from the intrinsic value of the ‘river’ would be around $20,000 million. Besides generating businesses and securing water for the city, the system will help turn Karachi into a clean and green city, offsetting heat waves and accruing many socio-environmental benefits. Of course, such a plan has to be implemented with carefully integrated considerations of sewerage and solid waste disposal systems under a unified authority for the entire city. The estimated cost of this intervention is in the tune of $5,000 million.

After diverting 2.5 MAF for securing Karachi’s water supply needs, we still have three MAF of water left that was saved from Rohri Canal. We can let this water flow all the way to the sea through the Indus River, but not without invoking another economic engine that runs with the flowing waters. Here we can go for the third intervention by turning the flowing river into an ‘Inland Navigation Channel’ – connecting the Arabian Sea to an ‘Inland River Port’ established at Kotri. A carefully designed and administered inland navigation system between the open sea and Kotri will help bring cargo worth millions of dollars each day at the inland port. This will not only relieve huge stress from the overcrowded port of Karachi but also free up the congested highway spaces within the city. The port will serve the industry and business within Karachi more effectively, while the cargo destined for areas north of Karachi will be more effectively handled at Kotri’s inland port. Of course, this intervention has to be preceded by meticulous design and development of state-of-the-art inland navigation and port facilities, as well as rules, regulations and by-laws of river navigation. The estimated cost of this intervention is about $4,000 million, while its per annum revenues are expected to exceed $10,000 million within the first five years of its operation.

(Figure 4 illustrates how the proposed DE interventions can create engines of water economy. The economic values assigned to these engines are conservative ballpark figures, used here only to expound upon the concept. These ballpark figures have been compared with similar figures for a large dam in Table 1. This form of comparison can guide us in future decision making for investment priorities in developing dam equivalents for the future.)

Figure 4

Table 1 

* Non-consumptive use; projects can be built simultaneously

One of the biggest advantages of DEs is the ease of financing the interventions. Unlike large dams, which are unable to deliver any benefit until the whole project is complete from start to finish, any component of a DE intervention, as soon as it is complete, can start paying off its economic dividends. A DE, therefore, can start with a small seed funding and, with careful financial planning, its dividends can become the source-funds for the subsequent development phases.

We don’t need another mega project to solve our problems. What we need is a mega-vision to guide and coordinate smaller scale interventions into a grand vision—a “think global act local” approach.

Finally, it is worth noting that this DE illustration is applied to just one of the 42 canal commands in Pakistan, while the dividends already exceed 10 times the benefits compared to a large dam. We have at least another 41 similar opportunities to solve our own problems, and in Jinnah’s words, “let it not be said that we did not prove equal to the task”.

posted by f. sheikh


Abbas is an expert in hydrology and water resources.

Cover Photo: Rawal Dam

” TFUSA Discussion Meeting October 7, 2018″

( Please see below information and respond about your attendance by October 1, 2018. Lunch will be served during meeting. Please respond to email fay707@hotmail.com) 

Seeing Connections, Healing the Earth

October 7, 2018

11 am – 2 pm

Location:

Falaha Center for Spiritual Agriculture

259 Sugar Loaf Mountain Rd

Chester, NY 10918

Speaker: Aysha Venjara

Founder, Falaha Center for Spiritual Agriculture

As a keen observer of nature and long-time gardener, Aysha Venjara’s connection to the natural world was apparent from early childhood. Just ask her mother. Formally trained as a medical illustrator and designer, scientific researcher, and editor, she thrives in a world of minutiae, fixed proportion, and structure.

Aysha grew up right here in the Hudson Valley and moved to Ossining about 10 years ago after completing her graduate studies at New York Medical College in Valhalla. She has spent the last 5 years training in regenerative farming techniques, biodynamic agriculture, and permaculture design, including volunteering at the Stone Barns Center for Food & Agriculture and Hilltop Hanover Farm, and community gardening in Ossining.

In 2016, Aysha became the steward of a beautiful piece of land in Chester, NY, 3.5 acres of a former biodynamic dairy farm, and a 1950’s barn, lovingly converted into a home by a designer and musician couple, Martin and Laura Schnur. Aysha is currently working on creating a homestead/farm and is the founder of the Falaha Center for Spiritual Agriculture, an organization dedicated to growing faith, family, and fun through farming.

The Falaha Center was born out of a calling to both protect and share the gifts of the land and the home, most especially at a time when our connections to the earth, and one another, are under constant assault.

Agenda:

11-11:30 | Presentation: Aysha will be speaking about seeing connections in nature, and how we have a unique ability, and obligation, to help heal the earth

11:30- 12:30 | Lunch and discussion

12:30 – 1:30 | Activity 1: Making Lactobacillus serum

Lactobacillus serum is a versatile natural preparation that has a multitude of household and farm uses. And it all starts with something many of us do on a daily basis: washing rice grains! Participants each take home a quart mason jar of serum.

1:30 – 2:00 | Activity 2: Property walk

Guided tour of property with discussion of permaculture principles in action.

Is-imran-khan-an-extremist

The daily Dawn ran an interesting point/counterpoint set of articles on the presumptive prime minister of the country.

Nasik  Elahi

https://www.dawn.com/news/1426403/is-imran-khan-an-extremist

Understanding Pakistan’s relationship with Journalism

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Freedom of press being put to the test.

By Maha Makhdum

 

With the reputation of journalism on the guillotine across the world, Pakistan is an extremely interesting case.

The country has a multi-layered relationship with journalists which is complicated and complex. Here in Pakistan, it is not only the government that wields power. One has to remember the very close influential relationship between the State and its military body, and then, being the Islamic Republic, additional religious elements.

Before trying to assess the current landscape and the future of journalism in Pakistan, the following should be noted: for this piece, a majority of reporters and representatives requested to stay anonymous due to security concerns. The latest string of incidents reported on journalists emphasizes how the field itself is life or death in many circumstances. Geo.tv, for example, highlights that “117 journalists have been killed in the past 15 years in Pakistan, and of these, only three cases were taken up in the judicial courts”. The New York-based Committee to Protect Journalists lists 60 journalists who have been killed in Pakistan since 1994. The 2016 IFJ reported 115 deaths since 1990, making Pakistan the 4th most dangerous country for journalists in the world, and most recently, the RSF ranks it 139 out of 180.

These reports paint a pretty bleak picture of the state’s relationship with journalism. However, after speaking to journalists reporting on local, district, national and international issues, the situation becomes grey as each face different situations depending on the nature of the articles and information being shared.

The constitution of Pakistan includes Article 19A, which states that “every citizen shall have the right to have access to information in all matters of public importance subject to regulation and reasonable restrictions imposed by law”. Pakistan’s Electronic Media Regulatory Authority is a constitutionally-established federal institution responsible for regulating and issuing channel licenses, print and electronic media. Mohammad Tahir, General Manager of Media and Operations, states that “PEMRA has transparent guidelines for the code of conduct, monitoring, and parameters for information shared”. All this suggests positive signs. In theory, the relationship between State and press is one of respect.

However, Pakistan is aware of its struggle with anti-state elements and the consequences of fighting a war against terror in its own and neighbouring countries. National Security has used fear of war as its primary reason to monitor and at times restrict the flow of information. This means that journalists have to work within set parameters in order to get their stories printed- and to remain safe.

2003 is an example of the challenges journalists faced due to National Security. Local journalists reporting on security elements in controlled conflict areas such as FATA had very clear boundaries to work within due to Talibanisation in the area, ongoing military operations, and warfare between militants and Pakistani forces. These journalists gathered information from local political groups, the security agency and witness reports. All of the journalists interviewed for this article said that they have been “advised due to the nature of their reports to bear in mind National Security”. This advice can be interpreted as a silencing tactic and a way to censor the information, evident in the lack of research being published and publicized. However, the notion of National Security’s ability to withhold information from the public is a debate taking place worldwide. If it is a threat to journalism and its credibility, then this is something the journalist community needs to unite against and to debate and tackle.

Another problem for Pakistani journalists in the field is a lack of organisational support. Local journalists face different types of pressures and must be mindful of multiple perspectives when reporting on issues within conflict zones. Every local reporter I spoke to, for instance, mentioned that voluntary and involuntary self-censorship are used to avoid clashes with tribal elders, security agencies, the political power in that area, as well as different militant organisations who may get provoked by the piece, or pressure from these groups to share specific information. The reality for local journalists when filing a story is that it is bound to upset one of the factions. Then, the threat is not just to the reporter; if a local journalist reports on stories which tribal leaders or the militant factions do not approve of, they have enough power to expel the reporter from the area, destroy their homes, and threaten their families. It is vital, therefore, that journalists are provided with enough protection in order to report with integrity and without the fear to self, family or financial stability. In speaking to national and international journalists, it is apparent that the relationship between journalism and the different actors stated above depends on also how much traction a piece receives.

Governing bodies, however, have “not managed to provide legislation to meet the needs of journalists and the structures within media are weak”, as Myra Imran, Vice President of National Press Club Islamabad Chapter, highlights. For example, one journalist- who wishes to stay anonymous- describes how he had been kidnapped and injured while carrying out his duties reporting in one of the conflict zones. After his release, he was no longer able to continue work and now faces an uphill struggle to get any form of aid.

Local journalists are additionally troubled by lack of balanced reporting, which greatly impacts their credibility. If journalism is to both survive the threats it is currently facing and maintain a healthy relationship with the State, then local journalists are in strong need of adequate training, especially  in reporting.  Many young journalists struggle as they are untaught, untrained, and uneducated on the full scope of such dealing with sensitive matters and information. This is not helped by the fact majority of Pakistani media houses, channels, publications relay messages in line with their personal, political, and business affiliations, compromising the journalistic integrity of the information shared.

One needs only to consider the reality of the situation within the borders of Pakistan in which no journalist could write about blasphemy or corruption without fear. And the threat extends beyond just military or security reasons. With the weak state of privacy laws implementation, it is relatively easy to get information about the majority of people in the public eye. Fear of reprisal and those with power and influence adds another layer to the many conflictions and hesitations journalists have while reporting, which leads to self-censorship.

Due to the different military, religious, and political practices mentioned above for the silencing of voices and the (lack of) security situation within Pakistan, the middle narrative has faded and people have been pushed into camps: pro-military or pro-government. In a sense, the relationship between the State and press seems to be surviving. Above highlights how journalists have to contend with multiple factors due to political, security and religious reasons, or are manipulated due to financial vulnerability. As a result,  local journalists feel that their futures and that of journalism are being put to question. If the middle man is completely eradicated, then the relationship between press and Pakistan would be that of a vessel which projects an image that may not necessarily be true. In other words, the injustices faced by thousands of people continue until something catastrophic happens.