WHEN the Iran-India deal on Chabahar port was announced in 2016, it sent considerable shockwaves through strategic circles in Pakistan, and rightly so. Viewed as part of India’s encirclement strategy, Chabahar was seen not only as a potential rival to Gwadar, but also as an indication of India’s widening regional influence and as a potential outpost for India on Pakistan’s western flank.
Taking a wider-angle look, it also had the potential to cut off Pakistan from Afghan trade as the project, and the accompanying rail link from Chabahar to Zahedan and then on to Zaranj in Afghanistan could eventually have, if not exactly replaced, but at least curtailed Afghan transit trade through Pakistan.
A year later, the capture of India spy Kulbhushan Jadhav, who also operated out of Chabahar, added to these anxieties given that it was unlikely at best that his anti-Pakistan activities were not known to, and tolerated by, Iranian authorities. The noose was tightening and strangulation seemed inevitable with an openly hostile India to the east, a nearly equally hostile Afghanistan — considered to be heavily influenced by India — to the west and now Iran seemingly joining in.
But a lot can change in four years, and recently there were reports that Iran had decided to cut India out of the railway project and go it alone. Quoting sources in the Iranian government, media reports claimed that this was due to India’s reluctance to initiate their part of this project in the light of its increasing bonhomie with the US and also the related fear of sanctions, even though Chabahar had been given a special waiver by the United States.
posted by f.sheikh