“Justice & Vengeance” By Kenan Malik

A fascinating article by Kenan Malik comparing verdict by Judge Aquilina on Larry Nassar case about sexually abusing young Olympic gymnastic girls and Darren Osborne who mowed down Muslim worshipers in London and killing one and injuring many worshipers. F. Sheikh.

Two court cases last week, on either side of the Atlantic, helped illuminate the tensions in our thinking about justice. The first was the harrowing trial of Larry Nassar, the American doctor who, over decades, had abused dozens of gymnasts, mainly young girls, in his care. In the final week, 156 women gave personal statements, testimonies that were both distressing and inspiring.

In her summing-up, Judge Rosemarie Aquilina observed that ‘our constitution does not allow for cruel and unusual punishment’. If it did, she would have allowed ‘many people to do to him what he did to others’. She then sentenced Nassar for to up to 175 years in prison.

The second trial was that of Darren Osborne, accused of mowing down Muslim worshippers in Finsbury Park, north London, in a van last year. One man was killed, many others seriously injured. Osborne, who denies charges of murder and attempted murder, allegedly tried to flee the scene, but was set upon by the crowd. Mohammed Mahmoud, an imam,intervened. ‘I shouted, “No one touch him”’, he told the jury at Woolwich crown court. Osborne ‘should answer for his crime in a court such as this and not in a court in the street’.

Where Aquilina would have imposed an ‘eye for an eye’ punishment, if she could have, Mahmoud insisted that such retribution had no place in justice. There is no direct comparison between the two cases. They pose different moral questions and create different emotions. Had Aquilina been in Finsbury Park that night, she would probably have protected Osborne too. Nevertheless, expressed in Aquilina’s words and in Mahmoud’s actions are two very different conceptions of the relationship between justice and vengeance. For one, justice requires a measure of vengeance; for the other, the two are incompatible.

More than two millennia ago, the Greek playwright Aeschylus explored these very tensions in his magnificent Oresteiatrilogy. Written in the fifth century BCE, it remains one of the most profound studies of the meaning of justice.

Aeschylus’s Oresteia begins where Homer’s Iliad ends. The Iliad tells the story of the Trojan War, in which Greek warriors, led by Agamemnon, avenge the kidnapping of Helen by the Trojan prince Paris. In Oresteia, the war is over and the warriors are returning home. In the opening play of the trilogy, Agamemnon’s wife, Clytemnestra, brutally murders her husband on his homecoming. It is an act of furious revenge for his having sacrificed their daughter, Iphigenia, 10 years previously on the eve of the war to placate the gods.

In The Choephori, the second of the plays, Orestes, son of Agamemnon and Clytemnestra, is faced with a terrible dilemma: murder his mother or leave his father unavenged. He kills Clytemnestra.

In the final play, The Eumenides, Orestes is pursued by the Furies, deities whose role is to exact vengeance for sins such as the shedding of kindred blood. He finds refuge in Athens where, in the Acropolis, the goddess Athena convenes a jury to try Orestes. The jury is split. Athena casts her vote in favour of acquittal.

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    ON REVENGE, by Francis Bacon: Revenge is a kind of wild justice; which the more man’s nature runs to, the more ought law to weed it out. For as for the first wrong, it does but offend the law; but the revenge of that wrong pulls the law out of office. Certainly, in taking revenge, a man is but even with his enemy; but in passing it over, he is superior; for it is a prince’s part to pardon. And Salomon, I am sure, says, It is the glory of a man to pass by an offence.
    That which is past is gone, and irrevocable; and wise men have enough to do with things present and to come: therefore, they do but trifle with themselves, that labor in past matters.
    There is no man doth a wrong for the wrong’s sake; but thereby to purchase himself profit, or pleasure, or honor, or the like. There why should I be angry with a man for loving himself better than me? And if any man should do wrong merely out of ill nature, why, yet it is but like the thorn or briar, which prick and scratch, because they can do no other.
    The most tolerable sort of revenge is for those wrongs which there is no law or remedy; but then let a man take heed the revenge be such as there is no law to punish; else a man’s enemy is still beforehand, and it is two for one.
    Some, when they take revenge, are desirous the party should know whence it cometh: this is the more generous. For the delight seems to be not so much in doing the hurt as in making the party repent: but base and crafty cowards are like the arrow that flies in the dark.
    Cosmus, Duke of Florence, had a desperate saying against perfidious or neglecting friends, as if those wrongs were unpardonable: You shall read (says he) that we are commanded to forgive our friends. But yet the spirit of Job was in a better tune: Shall we (says he) take good at God’s hands, and not be content to take evil also? And so of friends in a proportion.
    This is certain, that a man that studies revenge keeps his own wounds green, which otherwise would heal and do well.
    Public revenges are for the most part fortunate; as that for the death of Caesar; for the death of Pertinax(1); for the death of Henry the Third of France (2); and many more. But in private revenges it is not so. Nay rather, vindictive persons live the life of witches; who as they are mischievous, so end they unfortunate.

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